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Abstract
Nuclear security combines both concepts of physical security and security culture within a nuclear facility
to protect people, property, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionization radiation.
Physical security means prevention, detection, and response to unauthorized removal, sabotage, and/or
illegal transfer involving radioactive sources and nuclear material. Nuclear security culture is the human
factor within the nuclear field which is considered a principal means to support and enhance nuclear
security system. This paper presents a study of nuclear security system already established within a
radiological facility considering concepts such as: deter, detect, delay, and response layers. This study
focuses on nuclear security culture in order to assess, improve, and complement existing nuclear security
practices.
Keywords: Nuclear security, irradiation, ionization, security system, radiological, security culture,
Cobalt-60.

I.

Introduction

The studied facility, Boukhalef Ionization Station SIBO, which is a part of the Regional Centre for
Agronomic Research in Tangier, Morocco, uses a source of cobalt-60 to research how to peacefully apply
nuclear energy to agronomy. Today, the capacity of the ionization source is 64,000 Ci, thanks to a
recharging operation carried out in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The IAEA’s mission is to research food preservation without chemical additives by adopting ionization
techniques, as well as other dosimetry and dosimetric calibration research.
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The SIBO station has a casemate equipped with a gamma radiation source, which generates gamma
photons of energies 1.17 MeV and 1.33 MeV, with a maximum capacity of 100,000 Ci. While using this
source, the radiation will lead to two safety concerns: radiation exposure and ozone gas. Before the
operator closes the casemate door and start irradiation, workers ensure that nobody is inside, because the
Co-60 source levels are high enough to cause death within a few minutes. Another concern is the ozone
gas emissions which result from the interaction of gamma rays with air during the irradiation of products.
When diatomic molecules of oxygen (O2) absorb radiation from irradiator, they break their connection
and separate into two highly reactive atoms which combine with a third molecule of oxygen produce
ozone (O3). Breathing this gas can trigger a variety of health problems including chest pain, coughing,
throat irritation, and airway inflammation. It also can reduce lung function and harm lung tissue.
Therefore, ventilation is necessary, and scientists recommend researchers to wait a few minutes after
irradiation before removing the irradiated products from the casemate.
Since the source of cobalt-60 is classified among category 1 sources, the security requirements applied in
the SIBO ionization station are based on the nuclear security performance objectives for radioactive
security sources of level A of the IAEA publication No. 11.
In this study, we will focus on improving physical protection measures and nuclear security culture within
this radiological installation in order to achieve efficient nuclear security systems.

II.

The History of Nuclear Security and Nuclear Security
Culture in the Ionization Station SIBO

The nuclear security system was installed in different phases. During the first phase in 2002, only two
cameras were installed. The second phase was initiated a few years later to improve existing security
system in the site access control system, intrusion detection system, and CCTV system. The main
enhancement however, was the installation of a Central Alarm System (CAS) by security specialists in the
police control station to monitor the Irradiator Building [1]. The third phase of development focuses on
the physical security measures and the operational security culture revolving around nuclear security at
the ionization station SIBO.

III. Nuclear Security Measures at Radiological Facilities
A.

Physical Protection Measures

The purpose of a nuclear security system for radioactive material, associated facilities, and associated
activities is to protect people, property, society, and the environment from malicious acts that could cause
unacceptable radiological consequences [2].
Therefore, the key stakeholders should establish a modern security system for protecting radioactive
material/sources used in associated facilities and related activities against unauthorized removal. They
should also work towards protecting radioactive facilities against sabotage, in addition to ensuring the
implementation of rapid and comprehensive measures to locate and recover radioactive material which is
lost, missing, or stolen, and to re-establish regulatory control.
These objectives are realized through security measures which should be designed to perform basic
security functions: deterrence, detection, delay, response, and security management.
These security measures should be based on a risk informed graded approach, and they should also use
the concept of defense in depth after determination of a national threat to radioactive material in use,
storage, and transport to/from associated facilities [2].
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States should develop security requirements that protect radioactive material from unauthorized removal
or loss of control. States should address both security systems and security management to ensure
protection [2].
The regulatory body should require operators to implement a security system that meets applicable
nuclear security regime objectives. Operators should design a system that can adequately perform security
functions in order to deter and prevent malicious acts. While deterrence is not measurable, it is clear that a
suitably robust security system can help to deter a malicious act. By implementing a graded approach,
such a security system could then be deployed to undertake multiple security measures from prevention of
malicious activities to reducing the probability of its occurrence [2].
1.

Detection

We can achieve the detection measures by different means as visual observation, video
surveillance, electronic sensors, accountancy records, seals and other tamper indicating devices,
and process monitoring systems.
By implementing a graded approach, the objectives of detection measures could range from
immediate detection, assessment, and communication of any unauthorized access to subsequent
detection of unauthorized removal through tamper indicators or periodic physical checks [2].
2.

Delay

Operators should implement delay measures to impede an adversary’s attempt to gain
unauthorized access, remove radioactive material, or sabotage associated facilities through
multiple barriers or other physical means, such as locked doors, cages, tie-downs or the like. A
measure of delay is the time, after detection, that is required by an adversary to remove the
radioactive material or sabotage the associated facilities. By implementing a graded approach,
operators can range the delay measures from providing sufficient delay after detection (to allow
response personnel to interrupt malicious acts) to providing delay to allow for timely pursuit
following unauthorized removal [2].
3.

Response

The operator should be required to communicate with law enforcement personnel following
detection and assessment to respond in a timely manner. The objectives of response measures
could range from immediately interrupting malicious acts to sounding alarm notifications to allow
the appropriate authority to investigate the event. The operator should assist the competent
authorities as appropriate in their efforts to locate and recover the radioactive material, including
cooperation in on-site and off-site responses [2].
4.

Security Management

Operators should be required to implement security management measures, addressing access
control, trustworthiness, information protection, security plan preparation, training and
qualification, accounting, inventory, and event reporting. The stringency of appropriate security
management measures should vary based on the graded approach [2].
B.

Nuclear Security Culture and its Characteristics

Nuclear security culture is defined as the assembly of characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors of
individuals, organizations, and institutions that supports and enhances nuclear security [3].
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The human is an important factor in nuclear security. He or she has a great role and responsibility in all
activities of radioactive materials, processes, and management. Therefore, a plethora of individuals and
various disciplines and organizations must work together, among them: the State, organizations, managers
in organizations, personnel, the public, and the international community. Together, through coordination
and dialogue, these stakeholders develop a nuclear security culture.
The greatest influences on individual performance are the beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and management
systems. These layers are the characteristics of nuclear security culture, the proper assembly of which
leads to more effective nuclear security.
Security culture model for radioactive sources is based on goals, principles for guiding decisions and
behaviors, and beliefs and attitudes. These three layers are broadly applicable to radiological facilities and
organizations, including radioactive source users and other entities that handle or store radioactive
material. Each of these layers is described in the following sections.
1.

Beliefs and attitudes as drivers of people’s behavior

Without a strong substructure of beliefs and attitudes about threats, an effective security culture
cannot exist. Efforts to instill such beliefs and attitudes must be carefully calibrated to reach
everyone working in the facility. The most important assumption for security culture is that there
is a real insider and outsider threat. Understanding that a radiological event could have
devastating health, environmental, economic, social, and psychological impacts is likely to
reinforce the belief that a robust security regime is not only desirable but also necessary [4].
2.

Leadership behavior as role models

Managerial behavior and proactive security leadership help improve awareness and culture at all
levels. Leaders are vital components in dealing with malicious capabilities, unintentional
personnel errors, inadequate organizational procedures, and management failures. They are in a
position to integrate the security regime for radioactive sources into an organization’s security
arrangements. Leaders can promote new and different assumptions and patterns of thinking,
establish new patterns of behavior, and change the physical environment, mentality, and guiding
principles. Culture, therefore, tends to mirror the real intentions, specific actions, and priorities of
the management [4].
3.

Management systems as tools to promote desired patterns of
behavior

The management systems integrate characteristics that either relate directly to the security of
radioactive sources or are part of the managerial framework, without which security cannot be
ensured and maintained. They are designed and shaped by senior management consistent with
their vision of an effective security culture and the need for appropriate management tools to
facilitate and support this process. At the same time, management systems ensure that health,
environment, safety, quality, and economic requirements are not considered separately from
security requirements, averting possible negative impacts on security. Characteristics of
management systems include visible and effective security policy; the safety-security interface;
clear definition of roles and responsibilities; trustworthiness determination; training and
qualifications; information security; change management; contingency plans and drills; interface
with regulations and other off-site organizations; and record keeping [4].
4.
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The ultimate objective of security culture development is a set of desired standards of personnel
behavior. Security awareness and culture are driven by personnel beliefs that security avoids
malicious radiological events, which may have devastating health, environmental, economic,
social, and psychological effects. While security awareness is a low-tier construct applicable to
the entire workforce, more rigorous efforts must concentrate on a high-tier culture construct that
targets individuals who manage and operate radioactive sources as well as those professionally
associated with their use. There are many overlaps between awareness and culture, and they are
often used interchangeably, but the latter implies commitment and ownership rather than
awareness of possible risks and vulnerabilities. Culture is a more proactive construct than
awareness. The behavior of personnel conscious of security culture includes the following
characteristics: professionalism and security awareness, compliance, personal accountability,
mutual respect and cooperation, and vigilance and reporting [4].
5.

Goal: more effective nuclear security

The goal of discussing the issues above is establishing an effective nuclear security culture
through providing a greater assurance that the entire nuclear security program will accomplish its
functions of preventing, detecting, delaying, and responding to theft, sabotage, unauthorized
access, and illegal storage or transport [3].

IV. Importance of Continual Self-assessment of Nuclear
Security Measures
Because the threats are always evolving, it is necessary to continually assess the existing nuclear security
systems and improve upon them to ensure they are consistent with the current threat. If personnel
understand that their contribution to nuclear security is important, then they will be motivated to
implement the nuclear security system effectively and vigilantly, and contribute to its improvement [5].
The purpose of self-assessing a nuclear security system is to provide a clear picture of the extent to which
the security system is valid, recognizing its weaknesses and strengths.
Self-assessment involves evaluating the key security system in the organization by comparing certain
indicators. Indicators serve as gauges, enabling one to compare current performance to reference levels
corresponding to optimal nuclear security. This assessment is an evaluation of a nuclear security system
through continual technical examination, which allows one to know whether this system performs its
functions properly, discover the weaknesses, and troubleshoot damages in real time.
Without harmony between personnel and the security system, an effective security measures cannot exist.
Thus, promoting the importance of nuclear security and enhancing nuclear security culture is an ongoing
activity.
The self-assessment of nuclear security culture is a tool used to understand the beliefs and attitudes held
by personnel that support effectiveness of nuclear security. Self-assessment also allows a competent
authority/facility/activity to build on those beliefs and attitudes and to diagnose signs of complacency.
The level of nuclear security culture may be difficult to assess as some aspects of culture are not visible.
However, by using various methods, including written questionnaires, focus groups, surveys, and oral
interviews, one can better understand the existing culture. It is important to recognize that the most
accurate feedback is attained from a variety of these assessment methods.
Self-assessment may be conducted at the onset of implementing an enhancement program. Doing so can
indicate what specific efforts should be included in the action plan. Afterwards, the culture coordinator
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may regularly implement self-assessments (e.g., every two years) to evaluate results of the existing
enhancement program and update the action plan accordingly. Self-assessments, with subsequent
development of prioritized action plans that address root causes of difficulties, are essential to
maintaining a strong nuclear security culture [5].
Security culture self-assessment helps both those directly involved with nuclear security and the rest of
the organization by illuminating how culture influences security performance. Effective self-assessment
encourages staff to accept ownership of the results and facilitates decisions that foster continuous
improvement. Benefits of self-assessment include:
• A deeper understanding of the human factor and nuclear security culture
• A clearer understanding of employees’ concerns, needs, aspirations, and motives
• The identification of barriers to and incentives for improvements to security performance
• The identification of barriers to and motives for change
• The clarification of employees’ opinions on security-related topics
• An improved capacity to self-assess the organization’s security performance and to analyze trends
within the site or monitor progress
• The increased prioritization of actions that strengthen the overall organizational culture in areas
such as internal communication and human resource management [6]
Self-assessment of nuclear security culture should complement the currently used methods for evaluating
vulnerabilities and nuclear security systems, thus helping management to refine the organization’s overall
nuclear security arrangements [6].

V.

Study Conducted in Tangier to Improve Both Physical
Protection and Nuclear Security Culture

In order to improve physical protection and nuclear security culture within the Ionization Station SIBO,
we have created a team to carefully study nuclear security. We started by making a simple map that
contained the nuclear security system already established within the facility on which we based our
theoretical study. It mentioned different areas which could be considered vital, and we took numerous
measurements including the height and width of the walls, hardness of doors, effectiveness of detection
systems, response time, and many others key notes were written in a special document for future
discussion.
We had also established a few potential scenarios for removal of the radioactive sources or sabotage of
the facility. The scenarios have been replicated in reality to help us to have a clear vision about the
effectiveness of the security system and discover its strengths and weaknesses. Some example scenarios
include:
• Calculated the time it would take an adversary to reach the door of the ionization station from the
main door of regional center with different routes
• Calculated the time it would take to break the door to enter the ionization station if the adversary
hasn't been detected, considering whether the adversary has access inside the station
• In addition, we calculated the time it would take to get from the ionization station doors to the
casemate which contain the source taking into consideration the various paths and whether the
adversary would have access or if they must break doors to achieve their goal
• Calculated how long it would take the response forces to deter the adversary in each attempt
To assess the effect of human factor in nuclear security within this facility, we asked to each team
member to present ideas that could help improve nuclear security. These presentations had been shared in
meetings which were held every 15 days.
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In the following section we will share the results and recommendations of the study involving nuclear
security system as well as nuclear security culture.

VI. Results and Recommendations
The primary physical protection objective is preventing unauthorized individuals from getting access to
radioactive material and stealing it from the facility. The use of penetration delay barriers securing the
material buys time for the guards to call for assistance and contain or delay adversaries until the arrival of
the response force [7]. The ionization station needs strong and sufficient fences to deter any attempted
theft or sabotage. In this study we started with the wall which surround the facility and some area which
contain glass windows. After obtaining all measurements and reviewing likely scenarios, we
recommended barbed wire affixed to the entire wall that surrounds the regional center of agriculture,
rather than limiting it to the wall surrounding the radiological plant. This measure can provide an absolute
security efficiency. We also found that it would be better to replace all glass windows with barred ones,
which would be stronger and higher off the ground.
Regarding security guards, we had proposed to install another new permanent guard post in addition to
the old one. This post would be managed by two security officers, with a crossing barrier to reinforce
external security.
In addition to layers and fences, prevention measure would be implemented to deter adversaries. Among
prevention measures we had proposed:
• A pointing system that tracks the presence of staff and trainees, recording the date, time and type
of check-in (entry / exit)
• A paper registry which bears the name of any individual (staff, trainees, visitors,..) who has
accessed the interior of the installation and a scanned copy for not losing the information
• Installing extra external lighting lamps along the fenced perimeter to give clear vision and deter
any attempt of intrusion during the night
The detection features are vital, so we suggested additional means of detection, to determine the entry
control effectiveness, and assess intrusions:
• Installing a walkthrough metal detector at the entrance of the ionization station that can detect
gamma radiation and neutron radiation (weapons, explosives...)
• Adding surveillance camera in areas considered blind spots in the facility
• Changing the current analogical surveillance cameras to IP cameras in order to improve image
quality.
Delay comes just after detection; in this regard we suggested replacing the turnstile door with a barred
turnstile which offers a high level of security for a single person crossing and an access control system.
On the other hand, it is imperative to take into consideration the human factors in order to succeed the
security system. Below are propositions to strengthen the nuclear security culture within the studied
station.
A.

Performance Measurements

Surveys are important for self-assessment because they establish a baseline for tracking changes over
time. Therefore, we set up a survey in order to assess everyone's involvement.
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B.

Task Management

The management system defines a set of activities related to the set of services (IT, analysis, verification,
validation, decision-making, etc.). The aim of this system is to give flexibility in carrying out tasks,
consistent work and a well-developed management system which prioritize security.
C.

Effective Communication

Effective communication is a main tool to develop the security of each organization. To improve
communication, we focused on some points as follows:
• Holding more meetings that can encourage team members to communicate effectively and make
each person participate in discussions about their current missions, priorities and objectives. The
meetings can be held weekly and briefly where each person has 2-3 minutes to present their work.
Special attention should be paid to identifying problems and possible solutions.
• Including videos to keep people moving since they keep everyone informed of major (and even
minor) changes and events in the business.
• Build an anonymous suggestion box, since each person is different and therefore communicates
differently. Some staff feel comfortable proposing ideas face to face while others prefer making
contributions anonymously.

VII. Conclusion
Because of the weight and size of the container (5 tons), the theft of the Co-60 source is highly unlikely,
but sabotage remains a potential concern, however. Following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on
September 11, 2001, there is concern that the source is vulnerable to attack by commercial aircraft. This
study was done in order to reduce risks associated with variant threats that can target the facility and the
radioactive source of Co-60. The results were very satisfying especially for nuclear security culture to
improve and strengthen nuclear security in the studied station. Such improvements can also deter insider
threats and therefore reduce threats induced or facilitated by these insiders.
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